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Resumo: Neste artigo, analiso pormenorizadamente os argumentos 
apresentados por Aristóteles em Ética a Nicômaco (EN) VI.9. O artigo é 
dividido em duas partes principais. Na primeira, abordo a primeira parte 
de EN VI.9 onde Aristóteles desenvolve a noção de boa deliberação, 
culminando com a apresentação da sua definição em 1142b27-28. Na 
segunda, abordo a conexão entre boa deliberação e phronesis e discuto a 
vexata quaestio de se as linhas 1142b31-33 podem ser lidas como intro-
duzindo a tese de que a phronesis fornece os fins morais. 
 
Palavras-chave: Phronesis; Boa deliberação; Virtude do caráter; Ética; 
Aristóteles. 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I put under scrutiny the arguments put forward 
by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI.9. The paper has two main 
parts. In the first, I examine the NE VI.9’s first part where Aristotle 
develops the concept of good deliberation, offering its definition in 
1142b27-28. In the second, I examine the connection between good 
deliberation and phronesis, and, then, I discuss the vexata quæstio about if 
the lines 1142b31-33 might be read as introducing the claim that 
phronesis provides moral ends. 
 
Keywords: Phronesis; Good deliberation; Virtue of character; Ethics; 
Aristotle.  
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The main topic of NE VI is the intellectual virtues. In this book, 
phronesis has prominence. Nothing more natural. Phronesis is an 
intellectual practical virtue and the NE is a moral treatise. After 
having presented and investigated the virtues of character 
throughout the NE’s previous books, Aristotle starts this new topic 
of investigation, which was already expected given his early 
statements that the virtues are divided into two groups (cf. 
1103a3-4 and 1103a14-18) and that he has already investigated 
one of them (cf. 1139a1-2). 
Nowhere in the NE’s books prior to NE VI Aristotle comes up 
with the claim that reason is supposed to be responsible to select 
moral ends. In fact, such topic is not even slightly touched by 
Aristotle in the course of the inquiry into the character virtues. The 
situation is not better in NE VI. Along that book, Aristotle does not 
formulate directly the question if the ends of actions are under 
reason’s liability; rather, the topic appears only surreptitiously and 
most of the time Aristotle remains aloof from it. In virtue of such 
discouraging overall picture, the interpreter is left with just one 
option if she wishes to insist on such claim: to resort to supposed 
implicit clues given by the philosopher in NE, most of them 
available in book VI. However, the task is not an encouraging one, 
insofar as the promising passages give rise to more questions than 
unravel them by allowing a wide range of competing interpre-
tations. Furthermore, some arguments are not utterly clear, 
puzzling even the most clear-sighted reader. Now, I shall analyze 
step by step NE VI.9 with the interest of offering an account of 
good deliberation and its connection with phronesis, as well as 
elucidating what role, or roles, are ascribed to phronesis in such 
chapter.  
NE VI.9 is undeniably the first piece of text which some 
interpreters call upon to corroborate their claim that Aristotle 
ascribed to phronesis the outstanding task of providing moral ends. 
The chapter’s last three lines are repeatedly displayed as the most 
striking evidence for such exegetical claim. Even though this 
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certainly is the most natural reading of the passage at a first 
glance, if one reads it in the light of the claims previously advanced 
by Aristotle and in the light of Aristotle’s argumentative interest in 
NE VI.9, one notices a passage with many quite obscure argu-
mentative steps, which can be read either to endorse the thesis 
that phronesis does provide moral ends or to refuse it. 
 
An inquiry into good deliberation 
Aristotle’s cardinal aim in NE VI.9 is to offer an account of good 
deliberation. A great deal of the chapter is devoted to such 
purpose. And Aristotle fairly accomplishes this task. The main topic 
of the chapter is announced in the first lines: “we must also grasp 
what good deliberation (εὐβουλία) is (1142a32-33)”.1 The investi-
gation about the good deliberation takes the whole chapter to 
come to an end. 
Aristotle starts the chapter making a case for the distinction 
between deliberation (βουλεúεσθαι) and inquiry (ζητεῖν). The two 
notions hold a hierarchical relation between them: deliberation is a 
sort of inquiry (cf. 1142a31-32). Such allegation is in absolute 
agreement with what was said about deliberation in NE III.2. In 
this chapter, in order to classify deliberation, Aristotle employed a 
set of words who keeps a strong semantic association with the idea 
of inquiry. For instance, the verbs “σκοπέω” in 1112b16, and its 
derivative form “ἐπισκοπέω” in 1112b17, the verb “ἀναλύω” in 
1112b20 and its related noun “ἀνάλυσις” in  1112b23-24, and the 
constant use of the verb “ζητέω”, 1112b20, 1112b28, and 1113a5, 
and its related noun “ζήτησις”, 1112b22 and 1112b23. All these 
Greek words associate deliberation to a procedure similar to 
inquiry. The deliberation is concerned with the discovery of the 
                                               
1
 All the passages quoted in English were taken from Broadie and Rowe’s 
translation. Most of them were slightly or significantly modified in order to 
standardize the use of Aristotelian vocabulary in the text. In this text, I made 
use of Bywater’s critical edition published in the Oxford Classical Texts (OCT) 
for the Greek text. 
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efficient manner to attain a given goal by investigation (cf. 
1112b15-17). The classification put forward by Aristotle in NE VI.9 
introduces a hierarchical classification already foreseen from his 
early statements. 
Next, Aristotle tries to determine if the good deliberation might 
be regarded as some sort of knowledge, as opinion, as good 
guessing or as some other thing (cf. 1142a33-34). All the first 
three candidates will be dismissed along the chapter. 
As deliberation was classified by Aristotle as a sort of inquiry 
and good deliberation is a sort of deliberation, good deliberation 
cannot under any circumstance be identified with knowledge. The 
first argument presented by Aristotle is simple and indisputable: no 
man investigates what he already knows (cf. 1141a34-1142b1). 
Knowledge is a state of possession of true contents while 
deliberation is a search, an investigation, where one is still looking 
for something, namely the best route of action. 
Good deliberation is not good guessing as well. Good guessing 
occurs without the attendance of reasoning and is something quick 
(cf. 1142b2-3); good deliberation does not share such features, for 
good deliberation can sometimes take a long time to come to an 
end (cf. 1142b5)
2
 and never occurs without reasoning (cf. 
1142b12). Furthermore, good deliberation differs from quick 
thinking (ἀγχίνοια) (cf. 1142b5-6), and good guessing is a type of 
quick thinking (cf. 1142b5-6). Thus, if good deliberation does not 
share any feature with the genera, ἀγχίνοια, it cannot be identified 
as a species of such genera. 
Then, Aristotle claims that good deliberation is not opinion. To 
support this claim, he is required to introduce a new premise. So 
far, the basic premise was that good deliberation is a sort of 
deliberation. Based on a new premise, knowledge will be once 
more rejected as candidate to the position of good deliberation and 
                                               
2
 Some lines below Aristotle says that good deliberation is quick, what seems 
to contradict the claim just made. I confront the two passages below. 
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opinion will finally be considered as candidate and, then, rejected. 
Let’s consider it closely. 
Who deliberates badly errs (cf. 1142b7-8); who deliberates well 
deliberates correctly (cf. 1142b8). The bad deliberation leads the 
deliberator to commit mistakes, while the good deliberation leads 
to the opposite direction. Good deliberation is free of mistakes and 
correct.  Good deliberation (εὐβουλία), what is taken by Aristotle in 
the passage as the same thing as deliberating correctly (βούλεσθαι 
ὀρθῶς), appears as some sort of correctness: correctness of the 
deliberation (cf. 1142b8-9). The details about what kind of 
correctness is the good deliberation will be spelled out later. The 
assumption that the good deliberation is a sort of correctness will 
be the underpinning assumption of the next arguments. 
Good deliberation cannot be understood as correctness of 
knowledge. There is no correctness of knowledge because know-
ledge does not allow mistakes or rectification (cf. 1142b10). 
Knowledge always implies truth and it cannot be rectified; if it 
could, it would not be knowledge strictly speaking. Neither might 
the good deliberation be classified as correctness of opinion, 
because the correctness of opinion is truth (cf. 1142b11). 
Moreover, the things which opinion is concerned about are already 
determined (cf. 1142b11-12) and, as Aristotle argued before, good 
deliberation is a sort of investigation; it is about what is still going 
to occur and, wherefore, is not determined. Broadie reads it as 
ontological indeterminacy (cf. 2002, p. 376). To judge that 
something is is to assume that something already exists and that it 
is subjected to opinion. To deliberate about something, however, is 
to assume that there are still open possibilities to something being 
in one way or other – or even not being –, and, wherefore, it is to 
assume its ontological indeterminacy. Furthermore, while opinion 
is an affirmation, good deliberation is not, because good delibe-
ration is a search that has not come to an end yet (cf. 11142b13-
15). 
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At the end, as it was already expected, we are left with the 
claim that the good deliberation is correctness of deliberation. In 
spite of being an important result, it is still insufficient to 
delimitate properly the limits of good deliberation. The reason for 
thinking so is that correctness is said in many ways (cf. 1142b17) 
so that it is still necessary to clarify what sort of correctness is at 
stake when one alludes to correctness of deliberation. 
As correctness can refer both to means
3
 and to ends of the 
actions, it is meticulously explored by Aristotle in these two fronts. 
The argument follows: 
 
Since correctness is of more than one kind, clearly correct deliberation is 
not any and every kind of correctness; (i) for by calculation the acratic 
person, or the one with a bad character, will achieve what his project 
requires, thereby having ‘deliberated correctly’, although he will have got 
himself a great evil. (ii) But to have deliberated well is thought to be a 
good thing; for it is this sort of correctness of deliberation that is good 
deliberation, i.e. the sort that enables one to achieve what is good. (iii) 
But it is also possible to achieve this by means of false reasoning, and to 
achieve what one should have done, but not by the means by which one 
should, the intermediate premise being false; so neither is this enough to 
constitute good deliberation – i.e. the sort of deliberation by which one 
achieves what one should, yet not by means by which one should. 
(1142b17-26) 
 
In the passage (i), Aristotle deals directly with the efficiency of 
the means in contrast with the badness of the ends. The out-
standing examples are the acratic and the person with a bad 
character. Both of them are acutely skilful to obtain what they long 
for. They put an end before themselves and successfully achieved it 
by working out the effective manner of getting it (cf. 1142b18-19). 
                                               
3 “Means” is a rough translation of the Greek expression “τὰ πρòς τὰ τέλη” (cf. 
1111b26, 1112b11-12, 1112b33-34, 1113a14-15, 1113b3-4, and 1145a6). 
Since it is not the most accurate translation, I will use it only as a label with 
the unique intention of making easier the reference to the Greek expression, 
instead of frequently using long translations such as “what conduces to the 
end” or “the things that forwards our ends”. 
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Nevertheless, even though they are efficient in calculating the 
means, what they obtain is a great evil for themselves (cf. 
1142b20). Even so, one must inescapably admit that such deli-
beration is in some sense a good deliberation, for it attains what 
was proposed as goal, in other words, the deliberator deliberates 
well for the sake of the end assumed. Albeit it can be said good 
deliberation in one sense, I mean, in the sense of successfully 
achieving the end assumed, it is not good deliberation strictly 
speaking. The true meaning of good deliberation is not suitably 
apprehended by appealing to the notion of efficiency alone. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to say that, although efficiency by itself 
does not characterize as one should the notion of good 
deliberation, since efficiency also includes deliberations carried out 
by acratic and vicious individuals, it is one of the features of the 
good deliberation. 
In excerpt (ii), Aristotle goes ahead in the argumentation by 
introducing a new requirement to good deliberation: a good goal.  
The goal cannot be bad. So, the deliberations of the acratic and 
vicious characters are completely excluded as involving good 
deliberation. However, to put before oneself a good goal is not 
enough, the correctness involved in the good deliberation entails 
to reach a good goal (cf. 1142b22). A deliberation that is efficient 
in proposing means but is not able to attain a good goal does not 
have the kind of correctness demanded by good deliberation. 
The two requisites above, means efficiency and good goal, are 
not enough to perfectly portray the good deliberation. Some 
important issues stem from the characterisation above: should one 
apply to the means just the efficiency criterion? Or should it have a 
moral criterion as well? As one has seen, the moral agent has to 
deploy efficient means able to obtain the good end if she wishes to 
deliberate well. Notwithstanding, the moral agent, Aristotle 
argues, is not allowed to deploy each and every means in the 
actions. If she were allowed, one would have to assume that 
someone can morally reach a good end by blameworthy means. 
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Such concerns are brought to light by Aristotle himself in the 
passage (iii). 
The passage is tricky. Aristotle employs a quite obscure 
syllogistic vocabulary. In the whole NE, Aristotle does not expose 
in any moment the governing rules of the practical syllogism as he 
does with the scientific syllogism in the Analytics
4
. He just makes 
some statements using syllogistic vocabulary without any 
commitment to spell out how its premises should be formulated 
and how the conclusions are drawn. Thus, to read the passage 
strongly orientated by the syllogistic vocabulary can be misleading. 
As it was noted by some interpreters (cf. Angioni, 2011, p. 327-
329; Broadie; Rowe, 2002, p. 376), the Greek expression “δι' οὗ” in 
lines 1142b23 and 1142b26 might be taken in two ways. The most 
obvious reading is to assume that the expression refers to the 
means utilized by the moral agent in order to attain the pursued 
end. If one reads so, the passage is rendered as arguing against the 
employment of censurable means in order to achieve a moral good 
end. Another possibility, less obvious, is to take the expression as 
meaning that the moral agent acts in a suitable way by choosing 
the correct means; however, the reasons by which she justifies her 
actions are not the correct ones. Angioni argues that it is a hard 
task to decide what interpretative option is the most suitable, 
abstaining from opting for one of them (cf. Angioni, 2011, p. 329). 
In commenting the passage, Broadie (cf. 2002, p. 376) adopts the 
same position as Angioni by the same reason. In his commentaries, 
Irwin presents only the second interpretation and endorses it (cf. 
                                               
4
 Angioni compellingly holds that Aristotle seems to make use of the syllogistic 
vocabulary in a metaphorical and loose sense in NE. I’m in total agreement 
with his view. He argues that Aristotle nowhere formulated practical syllogism 
rules in the NE, and, as consequence, did not explain its use. For a well-
grounded notion of practical syllogism, he continues, Aristotle would have to 
show how the logical form of a practical syllogism assures its validity, what he 
didn’t do (cf. Angioni 2011, p. 327-329). From the few passages available in 
the NE on practical syllogism, one thing is certain: it is a very hard task to 
reconstruct a practical syllogism theory, the evidences are rather cryptic. 
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Irwin, 1999, p. 248). Gauthier and Jolif (cf. 1959, p. 516) display 
a vivid interest in the passage. According to them, Aristotle is 
arguing in favour of the moral correctness of the means. Thus, not 
only must the moral ends be morally appropriate, as the previous 
passage evinces, but also the means.  In their view, Aristotle so far 
seemed to support the claim that the means would be irrelevant to 
the moral value of the action and that the means would be morally 
dignified by the moral value of the end; the passage, then, is 
presented by Aristotle in order to argue against such reading of his 
doctrines
5
. Their interpretation represents an exegetic novel only if 
one has adopted an instrumentalist interpretation of Aristotle’s 
deliberation notion.  In the constituent means reading (cf. Irwin, 
1975, p. 571-572; Wiggins, 1980, p. 226-228) or in the interpre-
tation according to which deliberation should be seen as a precise 
delimitation in each case of the general goal adopted by character 
virtue (cf. Angioni, 2009, p. 185-204; Moss, 2011, p. 241-251; 
Moss 2012, p. 197-198), Aristotle here is just making explicit a 
claim implicitly assumed long before because in these interpreta-
tions the means are intrinsically associated to the ends. In the 
constituent reading, the means are taken as parts of the end, and 
the end is conceived as the set of means, which are its constituents. 
In the reading advanced by Angioni and Moss, the means are seen 
as the ways employed by the moral agent to delimit in the 
situations how to implement the moral end adopted still in general 
lines by the character virtue. 
                                               
5
 Gauthier and Jolif’s comments on the issue: “On a souvent l’impression, en 
lisant les analyses aristotéliciennes de l’action, que pour lui la fin seule a 
valeur morale, les ‘moyens’ étant de purs procédés techniques d’y parvenir, 
morale-ment indifferent [...]. Ici au contraire, Aristotle reconnaît expres-
sément que la fin ne justifie pas les moyens: il y a des ‘moyens’ qui ne sont pas 
de purs moyens, mais ont, par eux-mêmes, une valeur morale: on ne doit pas 
les employer, on ne doit pas atteindre la fin par ces moyens-là” (Gauthier; 
Jolif, 1959, p. 516-517). 
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I espouse Gauthier and Jolif’s position, but not because of the 
reasons they put forward. The reason is that I adopt an 
interpretation of the role of deliberation quite akin to the one 
proposed by Angioni and Moss. In virtue of this, the deliberation 
already has its moral value given in NE III. Unfortunately, I do not 
have space here to develop it properly. The remarks that Gauthier 
and Jolif draw in NE VI are not a novelty at all. In the next lines, I 
outline my defence of the first exegetic option. 
The first thing that should be taken into account is that the 
passage under scrutiny is designed to provide a portrayal of the 
notion of good deliberation, notion that classifies a particular sort 
of deliberation. This is the guiding clue to comprehend the pas-
sage. 
When it comes to the role of deliberation, one should recognize 
that at least three options are before us: (i) one according to which 
deliberation is responsible to offer moral justifications of the moral 
actions; (ii) another according to which deliberation is the capacity 
to choose the means to attain some end; (iii) and a third according 
to which deliberation involves the criteria (i) and (ii). The option 
(i) may be abandoned since the beginning, because Aristotle 
clearly does not conceive deliberation only as a capacity to offer 
moral justifications of the moral actions. The discussion is about 
whether Aristotle ascribes such task to deliberation along with the 
task of choosing means. I defend below that Aristotle granted 
deliberation just the latter task but not the former. Now let’s go 
back to NE III.3. 
During NE III.3, Aristotle investigates the concept of 
deliberation and delimits its reach. There, Aristotle twice affirms 
that deliberation deals with what conduces to the end (τὰ πρòς τὰ 
τέλη) in opposition to dealing with ends (cf. 1112b11-12 and 
1112b33-34). The reading that emerges from such statements is 
that deliberation must be understood as a procedure involved in 
discovering the means of the moral actions or, in Aristotle’s 
vocabulary, what conduces to the end. Such evidence assures that 
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one of the tasks of deliberation is to provide the ways by which the 
actions will be carried out. How about moral justification? Let’s 
read the passage below taken from NE III.3: 
 
For a doctor does not deliberate about whether he will make his patients 
healthy, nor a public speaker about whether he will persuade his 
audience, nor a political expert about whether he will bring about good 
government – and neither do any of the other deliberate about the end, 
but rather they take the end for granted and examine how and by what 
means it will come about; and if it appears as coming about by more 
than one means, they look to see through which of them it will happen 
most easily and best, whereas if it is brought to completion by one 
means only, they look to see how it will come about through this, and 
through which means that will come about, until they arrive at the first 
clause, which comes last in the process of discovery. For the person who 
deliberates seems to investigate and to analyse in the way we have said, 
as if with a diagram (and while not all investigation appears to be 
deliberation, as e.g. mathematical investigations are not, all deliberation 
is investigation); and what is last in the analysis seems to be first in the 
process of things’ coming about. And if people encounter an 
impossibility, they desist, as e.g. if money is needed, and there is no 
possibility of providing it; while if it appears possible, they set about 
acting (1112b12-27; the italics are mine). 
 
My reading seems to be corroborated by the excerpt above. The 
passage explicitly delineates the role of deliberation. In the 
examples, Aristotle displays experts (the doctor, the political 
expert, and the public speaker) trying to figure out, in their 
respective fields, the appropriate means in order to reach their 
ends. They put under scrutiny all possible action courses and pick 
up the one that will allow them to attain the pursued end easily 
and in the best way. At the end of the deliberative procedure, they 
find what should be done in action to attain some goal. The whole 
chapter shows deliberation as a procedure to find the appropriate 
ways of acting. The deliberation appears as an investigation and 
analyses of the routes of action. The idea of justification of moral 
choices is absolutely absent; this absence makes plain that Aristotle 
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endorses uniquely option (ii). Such exegetical upshot is highly 
fruitful to NE VI.9. 
Back to NE VI.9. The deadlock was if the Greek expression “δι' 
οὗ” in lines 1142b23 and 1142b26 were supposed to be taken as 
(i) meaning the correctness of the means employed in moral action 
or (ii) if it were supposed to be taken as meaning the reasons 
offered by the moral agent to morally justify her actions, or (iii) 
both. The Greek expression is presented in the middle of a 
discussion about good deliberation, just a few lines before a 
substantial account of good deliberation is provided by Aristotle 
(cf. 1142b27-28). As I have just argued, deliberation is not a 
procedure linked to justification of moral action at all. Hence, it 
would be very odd whether Aristotle unjustifiably introduced such 
topic into a discussion that is strictly relative to correctness of 
deliberation. The text does not even make room to the idea that 
Aristotle is ascribing to deliberation a new role, for the purpose of 
the chapter is not to display the tasks of deliberation, but to offer 
an account on a certain kind of deliberation, which has more limits 
than deliberation taken in general, so that it must be regarded as a 
further specification of the notion of deliberation. So, the features 
of good deliberation should not overcome the ones of mere 
deliberation, but only specify them, making them stricter. 
Moreover, the passage is so compact that it is more exegetically 
sound to take it as introducing moral correctness of the means 
rather than risk to introduce a completely new topic: justification 
of moral action by deliberation, which is not supported by early 
passages. 
The argument proceeds: 
 
Again, one person can achieve it by deliberating for a long time, while 
another manages it quickly. The former case, then, still won’t count as 
good deliberation; rather, good deliberation is correctness as to what 
one should achieve, and the way in which, and when, all in accordance 
with what is beneficial (ὀρθóτης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ 
ὅτε) (1142b26-28). 
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The claim that a long deliberation is not a good deliberation in 
line 1142b27 seems to contradict the assumption made in line 
1142b5 that deliberation takes a long time. The disagreement 
between the passages is superficial, however. As Angioni remarks 
(cf. 2011, p. 326), line 1142b5 is not saying that deliberation is 
bound to take a long time, instead the claim advanced is that it 
might take a long time, the existence of swift deliberation is in no 
moment threatened. With these allegations, the problem is only 
partly solved; it is still necessary to cope with the issues that stem 
from line 1142b27. At a first glance, it explicitly assumes swift 
deliberation as good deliberation inasmuch as it seems to exclude 
peremptorily long deliberation as being able to be classified as 
good deliberation. Thus, another apparent contradiction comes up. 
One way to disentangle it and shed some light on the issue is to 
resort to line 1142b28, where Aristotle established the three 
requirements for good deliberation. One of them is that good 
deliberation must happen at the right time (ὅτε). The conclusion of 
a long deliberation can arrive too late so that the moral action is 
no longer needed: action time ran out. In virtue of such situation, 
we can reasonably suppose that Aristotle seems to eschew such 
cases, excluding as good deliberations only a specific kind of long 
deliberation: the deliberation whose conclusion is reached in a 
moment where the moral action is no longer necessary. It is not 
reasonable to exclude each and every case of long deliberation if 
some of them do not affect negatively the actions. This solution 
avoids the apparent contradiction
6
.  
Aristotle sums up good deliberation requirements in lines 
1142b27-28. They are three: (i) what should be done (οὗ δεῖ) 
(discussed in 1142b18-22), (ii) how it should be done (ὣς) 
(discussed in 1142b22-26), and (iii) when (ὅτε) (discussed in 
1142b3-5 and 1142b26-27). Thus, a good deliberation has as its 
                                               
6
 An interpretation in these lines is briefly suggested by Burnet (cf. 1900, p. 
277) and thoroughly developed by Gauthier and Jolif (cf. 1959, p. 517). 
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features the goodness of the end, the morality and efficiency of the 
means, and the appropriateness of the time. It is quite reasonable 
to suppose that Aristotle could have finished the inquiry into good 
deliberation at this point, since we are definitely before a full 
characterization of it. Nonetheless, he unexpectedly proceeds and 
draws some relations between good deliberation and phronesis. In 
the remaining passage, it is not completely clear if Aristotle’s 
purpose is to continue to delimit good deliberation notion or if his 
purpose is to establish properly how good deliberation and 
phronesis tightly hold hands. However, taking into account that all 
requirements of good deliberation were already presented, it 
seems that Aristotle is opting for the second route
7
. 
 
Phronesis and moral ends 
Finally, we are in the last lines of the chapter, certainly one of 
the most controversial passages in the entire NE. I quote it at 
length: 
 
(i) Again, it is possible to have deliberated well either without quali-
fication (ἁπλῶς) or in relation to some specific end (πρóς τι τέλος): good 
deliberation without qualification, then, will be deliberation that is 
successful in relation to the end without qualification, while the specific 
kind will be deliberation that is successful in relation to some specific 
end. (ii) So if it is characteristic of the phronimos to deliberate well, good 
deliberation will be that sort of correctness that corresponds to what 
conduces to the end, of which phronesis is the true supposition (εἰ δὴ τῶν 
                                               
7
 By interpreting the difference between deliberation ἁπλῶς and deliberation 
πρóς τι τέλος, Aubenque remarks that the difference is an addition that has no 
important impact on the argumentation carried out so far because the official 
definition of good deliberation was already presented in 1142b27-28 
(Aubenque, 1965, p. 47). Engberg-Pedersen appears to endorse such view as 
well. He defends that Aristotle advances a preliminary and a final definition of 
good deliberation. The preliminary appears in lines 1142b27-28, while the 
last definition appears in lines 1142b32-33, however the last one determines 
only the meaning of good deliberation ἁπλῶς, not of good deliberation in 
general (cf. Engberg-Pedersen, p. 195-196). 
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φρονíμων τò εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλíα εἴη ἂν ὸρθóτης ἡ κατὰ τò συμφέρον 
πρòς τò τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρóνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπóληψíς ἐστιν). (1142b28-33) 
 
In passage (i), Aristotle divides the good deliberation into two 
kinds: good deliberation ἁπλῶς and good deliberation πρóς τι τέλος. 
The passage does not bring any clue about why Aristotle drew such 
division. To the interpreter, the solution left is to look for passages 
in NE which may shed some light on the issue. 
At a first glance, one might take the text as saying that there is a 
difference between a deliberation that regards just one end in 
opposition to a deliberation that regards a complex range of ends. 
In fact, some interpreters hold that the deliberation ἁπλῶς means a 
deliberation that concerns happiness (cf. Irwin, 1999, p. 249; 
Sherman, 1989, p. 88; Reeve, 2002, p. 82-84; Kraut, 1991, p. 38). 
As happiness might be taken as a compound of ends, it fits into the 
idea that good deliberation ἁπλῶς might be seen as referring to a 
deliberation that marshals well the demands of the total set of 
ends in opposition to a deliberation that meets the demands of just 
one end. 
In a very compelling interpretation, Angioni (cf. 2011, p. 330) 
argues that the word “ἁπλῶς” sometimes signifies “with no further 
specification” in opposition to “in a precise and exact manner”. 
According to him, such sense is found, for instance, in EE 1221b7. 
In this passage, the word “ἁπλῶς” is used in opposition to the word 
“ἀκριβέστερον”. Thus, a good deliberation ἁπλῶς might be under-
stood as a good deliberation regarding any kind of end, whichever 
it is, whilst a good deliberation πρóς τι τέλος might be taken as 
relative to a specific end. From such framework, Angioni argues in 
favour of an anticipation of a conceptual distinction that will be 
made by Aristotle in lines 1144a26-29. As the good deliberation 
ἁπλῶς responds for any sort of good deliberation, no matter if it is 
toward a bad or good end, it should be associated to cleverness, a 
capacity to deliberate well whichever is the end. On the other 
hand, the good deliberation πρóς τι τέλος is associated to phronesis 
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and its meaning is further delimited by Aristotle in lines 1142b32-
33: such good deliberation is about one specific end, the end of 
which phronesis has a true supposition. 
Two arguments can be displayed against Angioni’s interpret-
tation: one based on my reading of the first part of NE VI.9 and 
another based on my reading of the passage at stake now. The 
former argument shall be expounded now; the latter shall be 
developed afterwards in discussing Tuozzo’s construal. 
As one has seen, the lines 1142b27-28 gave a definition of good 
deliberation. A good deliberation necessarily involves correction of 
the end (οὗ δεῖ), of the means (ὣς), and of the time (ὅτε). Thus, it 
is excluded as instance of good deliberation any deliberation that 
has a morally censurable goal although the end is successfully 
achieved. Efficiency is a necessary condition to good deliberation, 
not a sufficient one. The passage on good deliberation ἁπλῶς and 
good deliberation πρóς τι τέλος is just after the delimitation of good 
deliberation so that I think it is unlikely that Aristotle modified the 
meaning of the notion of good deliberation within a few lines from 
a narrow sense to a broad one so that it could include the 
deliberations carried out by cleverness as cases of good delibera-
tion. The deliberations issued by cleverness clearly fail to fulfil the 
οὗ δεῖ criterion. In virtue of it, I think Angioni’s attempt to 
associate good deliberation ἁπλῶς and cleverness is threatened. 
The difference between deliberation ἁπλῶς e deliberation πρóς τι 
τέλος should be drawn within the limits established to good 
deliberation in 1142b27-28. 
Another interpretive shaft is brought forward by Tuozzo. His 
approach construes the passage appealing to an excerpt taken from 
NE VI.5, where Aristotle says: 
 
Well, it is thought characteristic of a phronimos to be able to deliberate 
well about the things that are good and advantageous to himself, not in 
specific contexts, e.g. what sorts of things conduce to health, or to 
physical strength, but what sorts of things conduce to the good life in 
general (δοκεῖ δὴ φρονíμου εἶναι τò δúνασται καλῶς βουλεúσασθαι περì τὰ 
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αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καì συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρòς ὑγíειαν, πρòς 
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρòς τò εὖ ζῆν ὅλως). An indication of this is that we also 
call those in a specific field phronimos if they succeed in calculating well 
towards some specific worthy end on matters where no exact technique 
applies. So in fact the description ‘phronimos’ belongs in general to the 
person who is good at deliberation. (1140a25-31)  
 
The passage sets up a difference between someone who is a 
good deliberator in good and advantageous things to herself in one 
specific field and someone who is a good deliberator in good and 
advantageous things to herself regarding the good life in general
8
. 
The first type of deliberation is depicted as a deliberation κατὰ 
μέρος, while the second type is depicted, in contrast with the first, 
as a deliberation οὐ κατὰ μέρος but a deliberation about τò εὖ ζῆν 
ὅλως. Aristotle’s purpose in drawing such distinction seems to be to 
argue that the deliberation carried out by phronesis embraces all 
the means concerned with the well-living; phronesis is not 
restricted to just one of the areas of the well-living. 
Phronesis deliberates in view of health and strength because 
they are part of the well-being (cf. 1098b12-14). The two cases 
seem to be expounded as instances of the deliberation about τò εὖ 
ζῆν ὅλως. Here, however, an important exegetical issue arises. 
Remarkably, Tuozzo points out that health and strength are ends 
of two techniques. Health is an end of medicine while strength is 
an end of gymnastics. By this reason, he convincingly argues that 
                                               
8
 Considering that deliberation is uniquely concerned with things that 
conduces to the end (cf. 1111b26, 1112b11-12, 1112b33-34, 1113a14-15, 
and 1113b3-4), I see no reason to read the passage above as making room for 
the claim that there is a deliberation of ends. I agree with Tuozzo’s claim that 
the expression “ποῖα πρòς” is clearly alluding to the steps necessaries to attain 
the end when it refers to health and strength in the passage (cf. Tuozzo, p. 
199-200), so that it is reasonable to read in the same sense the expression 
“ποῖα πρòς” when it refers to good living in general. It amounts to say that 
phronesis deliberates about everything that is concerned with the well living. 
Thus, if an end contributes to the well living, the necessary means to its 
attainment shall be found by phronesis. 
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the sort of reasoning involved in such ends is not the same as the 
one involved in the deliberation of the phronimos. Tuozzo assumes 
that the former stands for technical reasoning and the latter stands 
for moral deliberation (cf. Tuozzo, 1991, p. 200). According to 
him, the contrast displayed by Aristotle is not based on the 
opposition part and whole but is based on an opposition between 
subject matters. Aristotle is opposing technical reasoning to moral 
reasoning. The fact that Aristotle concisely discusses the distinc-
tions between phronesis and technique in lines 1140b1-7 provides 
support to Tuozzo’s approach. Besides, Tuozzo adduces in favour 
of his claim a passage from NE VI.7, where Aristotle again 
introduces the opposition between ὅλως and κατὰ μέρος: 
 
As for wisdom, this we ascribe, in the case of the various kinds of 
technical expertise, to those experts in them who are most precise, e.g. 
Pheidias is an accomplished worker in stone, Polycleitus in bronze, here 
at any rate meaning no more by wisdom than virtue in technical 
expertise; but we think that there are people who are wise in a general 
(ὅλως), not in a specific sense (οὐ κατὰ μέρος), and not accomplished in 
something else [...] So it is clear that philosophical wisdom will be the 
most precise of the kinds of knowledge. (1141a9-14, 16-17) 
 
Tuozzo argues that the passage clearly exemplifies a difference 
of subject matter by using an opposition between ὅλως and κατὰ 
μέρος. On one hand, there is the wisdom κατὰ μέρος, which is 
concerned with the techniques; on the other hand, there is the 
philosophical wisdom that is classified as wisdom ὅλως (Tuozzo, 
1991, p. 201). The result is that there are two sorts of wise people. 
The first group embraces all those who mastered some technique 
and, because of it, are told to be wise. Such kind of people has 
wisdom κατὰ μέρος. The second group encompasses all those who 
know the principles and who know what follows from the 
principles, they possess wisdom ὅλως (cf. 1141a17-18). Tuozzo’s 
aim is to show that, in the excerpt, Aristotle is ascribing a primary 
and a secondary meaning, which is based on a distinction of 
subject matter, to the word “σοφός” by using the expressions “κατὰ 
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μέρος” and “ὅλως”. In order to prove that Aristotle consistently 
makes use of such distinction of subject matter in the NE, Tuozzo 
adduces another passage: 
 
We must next discuss whether there is any type that is acratic without 
qualification (ἁπλῶς), or whether everyone is acratic in some specified 
way (κατὰ μέρος); and if there is, what sorts of things make up the 
objects of this unqualified lack of self-control. (1147b20-21) 
  
The passage suggests that there are at least two sorts of acrasia: 
the acrasia ἁπλῶς and the acrasia κατὰ μέρος. Differently from the 
other passages, the opposition is not between the words “ὅλως” 
and “κατὰ μέρος” but between the words “ἁπλῶς” and “κατὰ μέρος”. 
Tuozzo argues that both opposition sets can be used to refer to 
primary or privileged cases of predication and its derivative cases 
(cf. Tuozzo, 1991, p. 201). In order to justify Aristotle’s replace-
ment of “ἁπλῶς” by “ὅλως” in the passages without change of 
meaning, Tuozzo invokes Bonitz’s authority. Bonitz (cf. 76b49-
77a52) recognizes the use of “ἁπλῶς” in cases of primary and 
secondary meaning by appealing to De Generatione et Corruptione 
317b5-7. He also recognizes that “ὅλως” might be used in cases of 
primary and secondary meaning instead of “ἁπλῶς” (cf. Bonitz, 
506a28-29), confirming the claim advanced by Tuozzo. 
After having presented all these passages, Tuozzo compellingly 
argues that the distinction presupposed by Aristotle in lines 
1142b30-31 is a distinction of subject matter. To deliberate πρòς τò 
τέλος τò ἁπλῶς is to deliberate for the sake of moral action; by the 
other side, to deliberate πρòς τι τέλος is to deliberate for the sake of 
some product of techniques. According to him, the same 
opposition is found in lines 1140a27-28, the examples of health 
and strengthen, which involve technical deliberations, are used to 
contrast with the sort of deliberation in which phronesis is 
involved, practical deliberation (cf. Tuozzo, 1991, p. 200-201). 
Now, I shall provide some arguments to resist to Tuozzo’s 
approach. 
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When it comes to lines 1140a27-28, the most important thing 
that should be noticed is that the distinction traced by Aristotle 
between “κατὰ μέρος” and “τò εὖ ζῆν ὅλως” is not placed in the 
middle of a discussion about technique and phronesis. Such topic is 
introduced just later, in lines 1140b2-4, and receives a quite short 
treatment. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the purpose of the 
passage is not to display the differences between the different 
kinds of reasonings involved in the different subject matters, as 
Tuozzo argues, but, instead, it is not to restrict the deliberation of 
phronesis to only one area of the well-being. As first evidence, I 
summon upon Aristotle’s claim in NE VI.13 that phronesis 
accompanies all the character virtues in their different areas in 
order to ensure the dianoetic part involved in the actions.; it 
attends to all moral actions from courage to temperance to 
generosity (cf. 1145a1-2). 
My proposal, however, must cope with one strong hindrance. In 
the passage discussed, Aristotle provides two examples that come 
from the crafts: health and strength. The former is the aim of 
medicine; the latter, the aim of gymnastics. Tuozzo points out that 
including these cases as cases of deliberation of phronesis would 
contradict the claim made in line 1140a30, where Aristotle says 
that one calls phronimos those who deliberate well in view of some 
good end of which there is no craft (cf. Tuozzo, 1991, p. 200). One 
way out of this puzzle is to argue that deliberations for the sake of 
health or strength can be taken in two senses, a broad and a 
narrow one. In the narrow sense, such deliberations refer to the 
deliberation involved in the technical reasoning of medicine and 
gymnastics. Any interpreter is completely forbidden to assume that 
the phronimos can deliberate about these affairs. The phronimos 
does not deal with the goals of crafts. In the broad sense, one can 
include among deliberations that produces health, in addition to 
the doctor’s procedures, all the procedures that keep someone 
healthy or that allows someone to recover her health. One might 
think, for instance, of someone who went to the doctor and took a 
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medical prescription that stipulates what she must do in order to 
restore her health. It is up to her to follow or not the prescription 
so that it is ultimately her decision to restore health. If she follows 
the prescription, she will do things that conduce to health without 
being a doctor. In the same way, if someone eats just healthy foods 
and does physical exercise in order to maintain overall health, 
wellness, and strength, she is acting for the sake of health without 
being a doctor. In lines 1141b18-21, Aristotle himself gives an 
example of deliberation about healthy eating where he links the 
consumption of light meats to health; the example is brought 
forward in a context where he is arguing in favour of the claim 
that phronesis must know both the universal and the particular. In 
the passage, there is no evidence that such deliberation is 
somehow related to the craft of medicine. The passage clearly allu-
des to a deliberation done by a phronimos in view of her health. 
The excerpt conspicuously accommodates the claim that Aristotle 
acknowledges a broad sense of deliberation for the sake of health. 
Tuozzo’s construal that the deliberation about health and strength 
illustrated in NE VI.5 unavoidably represents a technical delibe-
ration is thus challenged, making room to my construal of the 
passage. 
The evidence put forward above makes room for my 
interpretation that, when Aristotle claims that it is possible to 
deliberate well either ὅλως or κατὰ μέρος in NE VI.5, the contrast 
drawn might be thought as being between deliberating well in only 
one field of the good living and deliberating well in every field of 
the good living. The last option is underpinned by the fact that 
phronesis goes along with all virtues. With these results, I return to 
the point where I had stopped in NE VI. 9 and delineates their 
consequences to the passage. 
I have shown that, at the NE VI.9’s very end, Aristotle argues 
that there are two types of good deliberation: the good delibe-
ration ἁπλῶς and the good deliberation πρòς τι τέλος. Even though 
one is not told how to interpret the passage, for the distinction is 
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not explained by Aristotle in NE VI.9, one promising way of 
interpreting the passage is to assume that the distinction at stake 
here is the same distinction expounded in NE VI.5. If one follows 
such proposal, Aristotle can be taken here as endeavouring to 
avoid the restrictive thesis that the good deliberation related to 
phronesis must preside over one domain of the well-living. The 
good deliberation ἁπλῶς includes all the ends related to well-living. 
One passage from NE VI.7 strongly suggests such approach: “the 
person who is without qualification the good deliberator is the one 
whose calculations make him good at hitting upon what is best for 
a human being among practicable goods” (ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς  εὔβολος ὁ τοῦ 
ἀρíστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικός κατὰ τòν λογισμóν) 
(1141b12-14). The good deliberator ἁπλῶς is the one who 
deliberates well about what is best for human being, in other 
words, he is someone who deliberates excellently about all human 
goods. Although the use of ἁπλῶς here applies to the deliberator, 
not to good deliberation, there is room to argue in favour of a 
parallel between the two passages, especially because Aristotle 
does not explain what he understands by good deliberation ἁπλῶς. 
If I do so, the passage gives us the clue to unveil the true meaning 
of the NE VI.9’s last sentences. By articulating the two passages, 
one has the result I have been arguing for. Aristotle’s main concern 
in establishing the difference between deliberation ἁπλῶς and 
deliberation πρòς τι τέλος was to block the claim that the 
deliberation ἁπλῶς is restricted to just one domain of good living. 
The same distinction should be applied to “τò τέλος τò ἁπλῶς” and 
“τι τέλος” (cf. 1142b30-31). My construal goes somehow in the 
same direction as the one of the interpreters who argues in favour 
of identifying the deliberation ἁπλῶς as a deliberation towards 
eudaimonia provided that one takes eudaimonia as covering all the 
domains of the well-living.  
Finally, I shall offer an interpretation of the very controversial 
final statements of NE VI.9. So far, one has seen that good 
deliberation refers solely to what conduces to the end, to what is 
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under the responsibilities of phronesis, which is the virtue 
responsible for deliberation (cf. 1140a25-26, 1140a30-31, and 
1141b9-10). In relation to the end, I shall argue that phronesis 
presupposes a good end, but phronesis does not provide it. 
In the NE VI.9’s last two lines, Aristotle associates good 
deliberation and phronesis. He affirms that good deliberation is 
characteristic of the phronimos (cf. 1142b31-32). Here one should 
be careful. The genitive of possession cannot be taken in a 
restrictive sense so that good deliberation belongs only to the 
phronimos. Phronesis presupposes good deliberation, however the 
other way round is not true. As one has seen, the definition of 
good deliberation given just a few lines above this passage did not 
presuppose phronesis but implied a good end achieved by morally 
appropriate means in the appropriate time. The lines 1142b31-32 
are put forward by Aristotle in order to relate the deliberation of 
phronesis and good deliberation. 
The NE VI.9’s last two lines are the piece of evidence which the 
interpreters frequently resort to in the interest of upholding the 
claim that Aristotle attributed to phronesis the task of providing 
moral ends. The text runs like this: “deliberating well will be that 
sort of correctness that corresponds to what is convenient to the 
end about which phronesis is the true supposition” (ἡ εὐβουλíα εἴη 
ἂν ὸρθóτης ἡ κατὰ τò συμφέρον πρòς τò τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρóνησις ἀληθὴς 
ὑπóληψίς ἐστιν) (1142b32-33). In line 1142b33, Aristotle uses the 
word “τέλος” in a movement that seems to refer to the τέλος ἁπλῶς 
discussed just above. Aristotle does not employ the full expression 
“τέλος ἁπλῶς”; nonetheless, taking into account the context, it 
appears as the most reasonable reading of the passage. The 
controversy of the passage concentrates in which way to interpret 
the relative pronoun “οὗ”. The relative pronoun is totally tricky 
and gives rise to many philological and philosophical issues. The 
first and foremost issue is to know exactly what is the antecedent 
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of the pronoun. Three options are usually put forward
9
: (i) the 
pronoun takes the word “συμφέρον”; (ii) the pronoun takes the 
whole phrase “συμφέρον πρòς τò τέλος”, or (iii) the pronoun takes 
just “τέλος”. The first option is the weakest exegetical one and 
might be easily discarded. Firstly, “συμφέρον” is an awkward 
option in virtue of being very distant from the relative; there is a 
long expression between them. One strong reason to reject the first 
option is that the word “συμφέρον” taken alone is absolutely 
inconclusive. To make sense, it must be qualified by some 
expression or word. For example, in the passage one has the 
expression “πρòς τò τέλος” that could clearly qualify the word 
“συμφέρον”. Thus, it is not an interpretative alternative to hold that 
the pronoun “οὗ” refers to “συμφέρον” alone and in consequence 
that phronesis is the true supposition of the convenient. 
Most interpreters are grouped around options two and three. 
These are options with more philosophical depth. In the second 
alternative, Aristotle is taken as arguing that phronesis has a true 
supposition of what conduces to the end. Such interpretation goes 
hand in hand with the Aristotelian claim that one does not 
deliberate about the ends but just about the means (cf. 1112b11-
12, 1112b34-35, 1113b3-4, EE 1226b9-10, and EE 1227a7-8). 
Aubenque, Angioni (2009), Greenwood, and Burnet espouse this 
exegetical alternative, which is deeply grounded in Aristotle’s 
previous arguments. In this interpretative line, Aristotle is not 
presenting a new claim but reaffirming an old one, already known 
by the reader. The third option is preferred by those who attempt 
to demonstrate that moral ends are supplied by phronesis. Ac-
                                               
9
 Not all the interpreters below put forward the three exegetic options but all 
of them consider at least two options: Stewart, 1892, p. 83; Burnet, 1900, p. 
277; Greenwood, 1909, p. 66, p. 113 n. 3; Gauthier; Jolif, 1959, p. 518-519; 
Aubenque, 1965, p. 46; Kenny, 1979, 106-107; Sherman, 1989, p. 89; 
Angioni, 2009, p. 193-194; Angioni, 2011, p. 329-331; Moss, 2011, p. 230-
232; Moss, 2012, p. 180-182. 
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cording to them
10
, the passage is a strong evidence to prove their 
interpretation. They take the excerpt as saying that phronesis has a 
true grasp of the end, playing the role of providing the moral ends 
of the actions. Such approach has some problems. First, in the NE, 
Aristotle nowhere defends one doctrine according to which 
phronesis provides moral ends. On the contrary, he insists on the 
claim that character virtue supplies the ends (cf. 1144a7-9, 
1145a5-7, 1151a15-19, to some extant 1114b22-24, evidence 
found also in the EE 1227b23-25). Thus, it would not be charitable 
with Aristotle to read the passage in such a way that he would 
seem to be advancing a claim that finds no explicit support from 
elsewhere. Given the obscurity of the passage and the lack of such 
doctrine, it seems implausible to ascribe the third interpretative 
choice as making part of Aristotle’s moral doctrine. Not even the 
NE VI.9’s preceding lines of the passage offer some clue to such 
reading. The closer step given by Aristotle in this direction was to 
say that good deliberation presupposes a good aim, what is not 
strong enough to attribute now to phronesis the power of providing 
ends. 
Notwithstanding, there is a second interpretative choice for 
those who take the relative pronoun “οὗ” as making reference to 
“τέλος”. Instead of arguing that phronesis provides the moral ends, 
one might sustain that Aristotle’s intention was to claim that 
phronesis has an apprehension of the end, nonetheless it does not 
entail in any way that phronesis provides the end. Phronesis has a 
rational apprehension of the end, which is given by other ways. 
Reeve puts the point in the following terms: “phronesis does grasp 
the truth about the ends, but it is natural or habituated virtue that 
enables it to do so” (Reeve, 1992, p. 87). Angioni (cf. 2011, p. 
330), implicitly reconsidering his previous position, endorses the 
position that the passage is arguing that phronesis has a compre-
                                               
10
 Examples of such interpretative option are Kenny, Gauthier and Jolif, and 
Sherman. The precise references were given in the last footnote. 
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hension of the moral ends, but it does not signify that phronesis 
has the task of furnishing them. 
To ascribe to phronesis the power of comprehending ends is not 
the same as arguing that one of its functions is to be provider of 
ends. Moss also adopts a similar view: “what phronesis adds is the 
right ‘supposition of the end’, where this means, [...], being aware 
of it as an end, i.e. using it to guide deliberation” (Moss, 2012, p. 
183). According to her, in the deliberation, phronesis has a clear 
view of the pursued end and uses it to steer the actions and to 
choose the more efficient and appropriate means. The end is given 
elsewhere, namely by character virtue, phronesis just concept-
tualizes the end (cf. Moss, 2012, p. 182). 
The passage discussed holds that phronesis is an ὑπόληψις of the 
end. In NE VI.5, there is one passage where Aristotle associates 
phronesis and ὑπόληψις. It is worth a look: 
 
(i) That is why we give sophrosune [moderation] its name, as something 
that sozei ten phronesin [preserves phronesis]. And it does preserve the 
sort of supposition [ὑπόληψιv] in question. What is pleasant and painful 
does not corrupt, or distort, every sort of supposition [ὑπόληψιv], e.g. 
that the internal angles of a triangle do or do not add up to two right 
angles, only suppositions in the sphere of action. For the principles are 
constituted by what those projects are for; (ii) and once someone is 
corrupted through pleasure or pain, straightaway the principle does not 
appear, nor that one should choose everything, and act, for the sake of 
this, and because of this – for badness is corruptive of the principle. 
(1140b11-20) 
  
The passage (i) clearly states that temperance somehow 
preserves phronesis, which is said to be an ὑπόληψις. Next, Aristotle 
argues that pleasure and pain have influence on the principles of 
actions so that they might corrupt or distort the principles. 
Aristotle, however, does not make it plain in passage (i) whether 
pleasure and pain are responsible to give rise to the ὑπόληψις of 
phronesis or whether they have only a negative role, that is, to 
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corrupt the view of the good
11
 established by phronesis. Passage 
(ii) appears as repeating the same claim. The principle does not 
appear to someone who is corrupted by pleasure or pain. 
Nonetheless, it leaves open the possibility for pleasure and pain to 
be determinant of the ὑπόληψις of phronesis. 
The positive role of pleasure and pain – topic fully treated and 
developed throughout NE II –, emerges implicitly in the NE VI’s 
final chapter. Here, Aristotle seems to be akin to the idea that 
pleasure and pain, when mastered by virtue of character, give rise 
to an ὑπόληψις about the principles of actions and not just corrupt 
them: 
 
[...] chains of practical reasoning have a principle – since the end, i.e. 
what is best, is such-and-such (whatever it may be: for the sake of 
argument let it be anything one happens to choose), and this is not 
evident [οὐ φαíνεται] except to the person who possesses virtue, since 
badness distorts a person and causes him to be deceived about the 
principles of action. (1144a31-36) 
 
In the passage above, virtue, a disposition related to feel 
properly pleasure and pain (cf. 1105b25-28, 1106a11-12), appears 
as a sine qua non condition for the apprehension of the correct 
principles. A sturdy evidence for such claim comes from NE VII.8: 
 
                                               
11
 Irwin argues that the convictions of phronesis about noninstrumental goods 
must compete with convictions about noninstrumental goods formed by our 
uneducated desire for pleasure. The consequence is that, when there is a 
struggle between these two convictions, the moral agent is not able to have 
the sort of conviction required for being phronimos (Irwin, 1999, p. 242-243). 
Taylor (2008, p. 209) argues that in the passage Aristotle meant to say that 
the role of temperance is only to preserve the true supposition of the end, 
which is clearly provided by phronesis. Sorabji (cf. 1980, p. 212) construes the 
passage in a similar way. 
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Virtuous and badness respectively keep healthy, and corrupt, the 
fundamental principles, and in action this is that for the sake of which, 
just as in mathematical arguments the initial posits are principle. Neither 
in that case, then, does reasoning teach us the principles, nor does it in 
the present one; instead, it is virtue, innate or resulting from habit-
training, that gives us correct judgment about the principle. (1151a15-
19) 
 
The principle, which might be taken as ὑπόληψις of the end – 
the association between them can be drawn from lines 1140b11-20 
–, is taught by virtue and, then, apprehended by phronesis from 
such teaching. Taking the passage in this way, I do not preclude 
phronesis from having a supposition of the end. Phronesis must 
have such supposition, for it is completely necessary if phronesis is 
going to fulfil its duty of finding the efficient and appropriate 
means to achieve the end. The supposition of the end works as the 
horizon towards which deliberation directs its efforts. So by 
following the Angioni’s (2011), Reeve’s, and Moss’ suggestions, 
and taking into account the passages above, it is hard to assume 
that Aristotle’s intention in lines 1142b31-33 is to support a 
doctrine according to which phronesis has the power to pick out 
moral ends. 
Even though the interpretation advanced is very reasonable, the 
interpretation (ii) also has its own merits and can hardly be 
completely discarded; it fits perfectly into Aristotle’s claim that 
deliberation, which is the task of phronesis, deals with things that 
conduces to the end (cf. 1112b11-12, 1112b34-35, 1113b3-4, 
1144a 6-9, 1144a20-22, and 1145a5-6). It is a more straight-
forward interpretation, because it does not presuppose a sequel of 
grounding steps. The list of passages quoted gives strong support 
to the interpretation. They clearly state that the reach of 
deliberation is the things that conduces to the end. Nonetheless, to 
uphold that phronesis is an apprehension of the things that 
conduces to the ends adds nothing to Aristotle’s early statements 
and just reaffirms Aristotle previous position. 
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Either way, regardless of which of the two interpretations is 
endorsed, Aristotle remarkably does not seem to grant to phronesis 
the capacity to deliberate about ends or to select them in the 
passage considered, which is usually taken as the most promising 
one to ascribe to Aristotle such claim. Such role is ascribed to 
character virtue. However, in order to implement appropriately its 
goals, the character virtue requires the presence of phronesis 
(1144a36-1144b1, 1144b16-17, and 1144b36-1145a2). Finally, it 
is necessary to stress that it still leaves open the possibility that 
Aristotle had ascribed to an intellectual capacity, other than 
phronesis – or even to phronesis, but in other passages –, the 
function of electing moral ends
12
. Unfortunately, such investigation 
is not within the scope of this paper
13
. 
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